



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BOOK NOTICES.

A VOCABULARY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES. (Including the Vocabulary of Philosophy—Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical—by William Fleming, D. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, from the second edition, 1860; and the third, 1876, edited by Henry Calderwood, LL. D.) By Charles P. Krauth, S. T. D., LL. D., Vice-provost of the University of Pennsylvania. New York: Sheldon & Company. 1878.

In 1860 Dr. Krauth had edited an American reprint of Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy, and, by his own additions, had made a useful book much more useful and valuable. In 1873 he contributed a very important work to Lippincott's Library of Philosophical Classics, by editing "Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge." The treatise itself occupied less than one-fourth of the 420 pages of the book, the rest being an industrious and scholarly collation of matter in regard to Berkeley and his doctrines, constituting, as it were, a sort of general treatise on Idealism.

Philosophical students who had felt the want of a more complete book than Fleming's hoped for a new work from Dr. Krauth, which would supplement its deficiencies in the manner of the "Prolegomena" of Berkeley. The present work, in a measure, supplies the want. The additions to the Fleming's Vocabulary consist in "A Vocabulary of Philosophical Sciences," containing nearly as much matter as the former, and more systematically arranged. Definitions are given, and the citations are more pertinent, and from authorities of far greater weight. Fleming seems to have little acquaintance with German philosophy, and it is the technical terms of German thinkers that furnish most occasion for a "Vocabulary" to explain them. Dr. Krauth has collected illustrations, not only of German Philosophy, but also of Scholastic Philosophy and Greek and Latin Philosophy. He has added historical material everywhere. The "Chronological Table of the History and Literature of the Philosophical Sciences, from 1860 to 1867," is excellent. He has prefixed to it Tennemann's Chronological Table, commencing with the birth of Thales, 640 B. C. A Biographical Index of Authors and of proper names follows. It gives dates and chief works of each author, also the subjects upon which he wrote, thus:

ABELARD, PETER (1079-1142).

1. *Opera* (Paris, 1616). *Cousin* (1849).
2. *Recently Discovered Works*. (*Sic et Non*.) (1831, Rheinwald; 1836, *Cousin*; 1851, Hanke and Lindenköhl.)

Belief. Scholastic Philosophy.

This index occupies over seventy pages in fine print.

A Synthetical Table of the Philosophical Sciences completes the book. Its "Part First" treats of "*Theory and Definitions*," showing the technical terms used in treating each subject. Its "Part Second" is *historical and critical*, giving the names of the several systems of Philosophy that have prevailed in the world, and then classifying them historically under each country.

The useful "Index of Terms," which is found in the original Fleming's Vocabulary, and also in Dr. Krauth's editions of 1860 and 1873, is omitted from this edition, because, we presume, the "Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences" renders it unnecessary by reason of its full cross-references to Fleming.

This is a work that every student of philosophy should possess.

"BURNS IN DRAMA," TOGETHER WITH "SAVED LEAVES." Edited by James Hutchison Stirling. Edinburgh: Edmonston & Co. 1878.

This small volume, from the distinguished author of "The Secret of Hegel," will prove of unusual interest to those who have read his philosophical writings. His intense, fiery style, his profound absorption in his theme, his amazing gifts at description of subtle psychological processes, rendered his book on Hegel what the Germans call an "epoch-making" one. He seizes the reader's attention from the start, and holds it by his power to throw the interest of personal adventure into his portrayal of the struggles and disappointments incident to discovering the thought of a great philosopher. We cannot but find healthful stimulus in the book, which shows us indomitable energy in the pursuit of an understanding or comprehension of a system of philosophy, however often baffled and defeated in hope by the prodigious difficulties which *technique* and vast syntheses create for one. The novitiate is always a thinker from the stand-point of *sense* or of *reflection*, and, consequently, his ability to make combinations—to think syntheses—is quite limited. He finds that his mincing steps are utterly inadequate to span the Olympian strides of the world-historical thinkers. The biography of the thinker during his process of education into true insight is part tragedy, part comedy; but its portrayal is of genuine interest to all rationally disposed men and women. Dr. Stirling is certainly the most successful of philosophers in his literary presentation of the steps of philosophic experience. This has been realized by a multitude of old and of young who have read his books. These persons will welcome the "Saved Leaves" as a desired completion to the biography of a true man, who has labored, with no mean success, to become MAN.—the generic type; to realize his race. We are all, potentially, MAN. We are what Aristotle calls "first *entelechie*s;" by education, by study of the great thinkers, seers, sayers, and doers, we realize in each of us the type of MAN, and become "second *entelechie*s." Human life has this great object before it: to make the individual who is at first only a particular, special existence, also a universal, generic existence.

It is all-important, for the sake of stimulating the courage of the novitiate philosopher, that the biography of the giant shall commence with the dwarf-period. This man, who can comprehend Hegel and unravel the tangled web of mystery which enshrouds the "Logic"—was he ever of childish stature? The greatest of obstacles to the progress of thought is the self-distrust which says, at the very first page of genuine philosophy: "Ah! I can never understand this. I never was born with the head to grasp it. Plato and Aristotle and Hegel had special gifts for such thinking." Such is the fatalism which utterly misreads human nature and its own destiny. For, surely, we are all born with limits, and no one of us but has the power to grow out of such limits as he may have at a particular time, by earnest effort. The capacity to grow is worth more than all "gifts," "natural talents," "genius," or "innate faculties." The highest human achievement in character is below the ideal possibility of the humblest man.

Stirling's character and capacity when a young man is clearly defined in the "Saved Leaves," prose and verse, wherein he gives his views of "The Novelist

and the Milliner," "The Novel Blowers, or Hot-pressed Heroes," of "The Foreign Country at Home," "A Peep into a Welsh Iron Valley," "Social Condition of South Wales," or utters his deepest sentiments and insights in more or less poetic verses: "The Ballad of Merla," "Belshazzar's Feast," "Venetian Madeline," "The Blacksmith's Hame," "The Enchanted Isles," and so on through the eighteen "saved leaves" of poetry and the ten similar of prose. We may readily enough discern the "stuff" of the man, but it is a "first *entelechy*." And it is a generous thought of the author to show us these firstlings. He says of them: "The 'Saved Leaves' are as they name themselves—saved leaves. There is a literary flush in most impressionable young students, from sixteen to twenty-three or so; of such flush these leaves are saved specimens. The judicious reader will probably perceive that some part of the 'saving' element was consideration of the variety of tastes." "It is different with 'Burns in Drama,' which, nevertheless, was itself planned, begun, and in large part written, in 1855. It is scarcely necessary to remark that, by this piece, no drama of plot or incident is intended, but only a study of character. With this object in view, the matter of concluding (partial) monologues was found unfit for the form of dialogue."

"Burns in Drama" is divided into five acts, and subdivided into scenes, after the manner of a drama. Most of the scenes of the first three acts would make a lively impression on the stage. The fourth and fifth acts follow the life of Burns into richer, nobler developments, but which cannot be presented with adequate stage effects because of their internality. The unity of the piece is solely that of subject; its time extends from the advanced youth of Burns to his death, a period of some twenty years; the place changes from Mauchline, and thereabouts, to Edinburgh, and then to Dumfries.

The contents of the several acts are given thus: "Act I. The Natural Jet—Awaking Youth. Act II. Opening Manhood—Young Blood, Young Feelings, Young Bitterness. Act III. Life, Love, and Horror of Eclipse. Act IV. Edinburgh, and After—The Blaze and Ashes. Act V. Dumfries, and the End." A note is appended, relating to the character of Burns. The characters are portrayed in a few masterly strokes, showing the very essence of their humanity. The father and mother, the cruel factor, the Laird of Coilsfield, the corrupt Rankine and his evil companions, the charming Jean Armour, the brethren of the masonic lodge, pass before us in the first three acts. The tragic scene at night, in which Jean communicates to Robert the grief and wrath of her father when their *liaison* became known, ends with oaths of fidelity and—separation.

Burns.—No, indeed, *puir lassie*! it wasna your faut—I've been a bad fellow, Jean—can you forgie me?

Jean.—I'm no' blamin' ye—there's naething to forgie—I liked you owre weel; that was a'.

Burns.—And dinna I like you, Jean?

Jean.—But you're gaun awa—you're ginny lea' me—you're ginny lea' me.

Burns.—I hae na siller.

Then the lonely night upon the moor, when Burns, hunted by outraged respectability, is on the eve of taking passage to the West Indies, to become overseer of the slaves of a plantation, shows us his deepest despair, so well depicted in the poem written on this occasion:

"The gloomy night is gath'ring fast,
Loud roars the wild, inconstant blast;
Yon murky cloud is foul with rain,
I see it driving o'er the plain;

The hunter now has left the moor,
 The scatter'd coveys meet secure,
 While here I wander, prest with care,
 Along the lonely banks of Ayr."

But hearing that the volume of poems which he had printed on the occasion of his departure was received with enthusiasm at Edinburgh, he changes his mind and goes to that metropolis. Here we find him, at the opening of the fourth act, in a blaze of glory. Dr. Blair and Professor Dugald Stewart are introduced to us as the representatives of his society there. But he returns to Mauchline (with the £500 received from the new edition of his poems) in the second scene of this act, vents his splenetic reflections upon the shortness of the season in which a literary lion is permitted to engross the attention of society. He stocks a farm at Ellisland, marries Jean, receives a visit from his old tried friend, Ainslee, and flings away ambition. In Act V, on his death-bed, he passes verdict upon his own life, speaking to Jean: "The hope of fame, of fame for ages, is to almost all — to altogether all, in the end — an unsubstantial dream." "It is of no use — there is nothing in it. Nature is beautiful, and God's world is divine — but man is a *lâche*, his world a hell. Draw the curtain, Jean — I'll sleep." The "professor and minister" pass judgment upon his character in the closing scene. No essay on Burns, or biography of him, gives us such vivid pictures of the man as does this "drama."

RELIGIONS PHILOSOPHIE AUF GESCHICHTLICHER GRUNDLAGE. Von Professor Dr. Otto Pfeleiderer, in Berlin. Verlag von G. Reimer, in Berlin.

The first part of this work treats the history of the philosophy of religion from the time of Lessing and Kant to the present. In the first three sections the author traces the development of the philosophy of religion through the steps of Kant's Criticism, of the mystical, intuitive faith-philosophy of Hamann, Herder, and Jacobi, and of the speculative school of Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, etc. In the representation of each system the general connection of ideas is properly set forth, and the truth, as well as the limits of the various stand-points, are pointed out. The last section sketches the labors of the present day on the field of the philosophy of religion, and discusses, in that connection, among other matters, those writings that have attained celebrity by means of the religious-philosophical controversies to which they have given rise — as, for instance, the "Philosophy of Materialism," by A. Lange; the "Philosophy of the Unconscious," and the "Self-dissolution of Christianity," by Edward von Hartmann; and "The Old and the New Faith," by Strauss. In every instance the standard of an objective, scientific criticism is applied, and the relative right even of opponents fairly acknowledged; but the ground of their one-sided results is also unsparingly exposed.

The second part of the book contains a "genetic speculative philosophy of religion," the method of which proceeds in the main from historical deduction in opposition to the *a-priori* association of ideas of Hegel's dialectic. But, on the other hand, in opposition to empiricism, it gathers together the results of the genetic development of that historical induction into speculative comprehension, and traces them back to their final grounds.

The first section treats of the religious *subject*, and describes the nature of religious consciousness according to its psychological factors, especially with regard to its relation to morality and cognition. The second section, which forms the

central point of the whole work, describes the object of religious consciousness, the matters of faith, in seven chapters: 1. God; 2. Angel and Devil; 3. Creation; 4. Theodicy; 5. Revelation and Miracle; 6. Redemption and Mediator; 7. Eternity. The mode of treatment here is as follows: After pointing out the psychological motives of the various faiths, the author takes the mythology of natural religion as his starting-point. Then follow the speculations of the most ancient philosophies in regard to the subjects mentioned, especially the speculations of the Hindoos and Greeks. Next comes the historical development of the dogma (1) amongst the Hebrews, (2) in primitive Christianity, (3) in the Christian Church; to which is added, in conclusion, a review of the theories on those subjects held by modern philosophers. Having thus brought the genetic development of the religious and philosophical mode of thought on every field to a close, each chapter ends with a critical speculative *résumé*, in which the points of view previously ascertained in the historically inductive part are balanced against each other, the relative right or wrong of each stand-point established, and their union in purified conceptions and formulas sought to be achieved. The author considers this the only truly objective method, excluding, as it does, all subjective arbitrariness (which to him appears utterly reprehensible) in the surest manner. Since history itself in its actual development is made to show up the moments of truth, which the philosopher need only to gather up and combine. At the same time, this mode of treatment has the advantage of offering a vast and varied historical material from almost all regions of the history of religion and philosophy in a grouping comparatively easy of review. Hence, even such readers as cannot agree altogether, or at all, with the author in his judgments and views on other matters will be able to gather many valuable additions to their historical knowledge from this work. At any rate, all readers, no matter what stand-point they occupy, must feel themselves incited to further reflections and investigations by the discussions and critical expositions of the author.

The third and last section treats of the religious communities. Here the discussion starts from the rise of objective religion and suggests its origin. This is followed by a sketch of the *cultus* in its main forms — prayer, sacrifice, and mysteries; and here again the historical development of the ceremonies is traced through the main divisions of religion. The origin, development, and religious as well as social position of the priesthood in the various religions concludes this chapter, and forms the transition to the last, which has for its object the Church in its manifold relations to civil society. Church-States and State-Churches are brought to view in their various historical forms, and the results derived are utilized for practical application to the present condition of the churches, especially in Germany. Although these concluding remarks are of immediate interest only to German readers, they cannot fail also to be interesting to those of other countries, in so far as the ecclesiastical condition of Germany will enable them clearly to recognize the apprehensions and desires of the free-thinking men of that country, and the obstacles which they have to combat. It is evident that the author favors a free relation of the Church and State, such as is more characteristic of American than of German life.

The above will suffice to show that this Philosophy of Religion is not an abstract philosophical book, but gathers most of its material from the historical life of mankind in ancient and modern times, and thus connects, also, throughout all its pages, with the practical interests of the life of the present.

P.

COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY; OR, THE GROWTH AND GRADES OF INTELLIGENCE
By John Bascom. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1878.

The author (president of the University of Wisconsin) discusses the questions of Mind and Matter; Physical Forces as Related to Vital Forces; Vegetable Life; the Nervous System; Animal Life as organic, instinctive, and associative; Rational Life; The Supreme Reason. These topics are treated in nine chapters. The array of curious information marshaled to support the acute reasoning of the author renders the book unusually interesting to the non-metaphysical reader.

GESCHICHTE UND KRITIK DER GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER GEGENWART. Von Rudolf Eucken, Professor in Jena. Leipzig: Veit & Co.

Kant somewhere says that one of the prominent philosophical *desiderata* of his time was an analysis of the then prevailing philosophical concepts. A very pressing philosophical need of our time is a critical history of the genesis of our concepts—of their origin and of the transformation they have experienced in the course of metaphysical and scientific discussion. In Professor Eucken's valuable work this need is, to a great extent, supplied. It traces the history of certain concepts which for some time have been, and now are, the watch-words of modern philosophy and science, from their origin to the present day. What these concepts are is seen at once from the table of contents: Subjective—Objective; Experience; A priori—innate; Immanent (Cosmic); Monism; Dualism; Law; Evolution; Causal Concepts; Mechanical—Organic; Teleology; Culture; Individuality; Humanity; Realism—Idealism; Optimism—Pessimism. S.

A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION; OR, THE RATIONAL GROUNDS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.
By John Bascom. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876.

In this work the author sets out in an Introduction with the excellent maxim that although Science may progress without a sound philosophy, yet Religion cannot. "The very facts on whose existence religion depends—the objects towards which it is directed—turn for their proof of being on the joint intuitive and reflective processes of the Soul; and till these are defined and accepted, those cannot be established." "The seat of religion is in the soul itself, not in the senses, nor in the physical world; and there must its sure foundations be explored."

He proceeds to investigate the Mental powers—the limits of causation and intuition—proving that the knowledge of Matter and of Mind is not direct; the Being of God showing that the proof of this Being depends on liberty, which is made possible by the moral nature and discriminating force, from spontaneity; "Force is definite in quantity, is local, is always in one way or another in exercise, however obscure and latent the form assumed, and hence is realized once for all, and equally at all times." "A necessary action—all physical action—is one fixed in time, place, kind, and degree by forces already in existence. A spontaneous action is one which springs from power disclosed anew in it; power that had no previous existence in any known product; power not actual, but potential; power not transferred in strict correlation from product to product, but springing up afresh in each. All purely intellectual activities are of this sort."

With the concept of Spontaneity, as underlying that of liberty, he canvasses the proofs of the Being of God—the cosmological, the teleological, and the ethical proof; for he slights the ontological proof as being "unsatisfactory," and "lightly held." "It infers the actual being and eternity of God from the ideal

necessity of eternal being to the conception of infinite attributes. It thus accepts a connection of ideas as a proof of facts." This sounds as if one would say: "The law of falling bodies may be true; but how do falling bodies act?" "No doubt that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line — these ideas are connected — but how is it with straightness and shortest distance as facts?" Our author is in spirit a realist, and the whole tendency of his excellent book is realism; but now and then he allows validity to nominalistic arguments, and, as in this case, confuses mental images, fortuitously brought together in phantasy, with universal and necessary ideas and their relations. To see a necessary relation between ideas is precisely to see an objectively valid necessity — a logical condition which determines the very existence of things. When we cognize, *a priori*, the nature of space, we cognize at the same time certain necessary laws of matter as it actually exists; because matter cannot transcend its logical condition. Just so the ontological proof of God proceeds from the idea of Being itself, and its necessary logical conditions, to find that all finite or dependent being has its logical condition in an infinite, independent being. The thought of a finite or dependent being is the thought of a being conditioned in another being — derived from it, supported by it, furnished with energy from it — that is to say, the finite being loses its individuality in its dependence. But the supporting energy, no matter how many other dependent beings are linked between the first dependent being and that on which it depends, is itself independent and self-determined — a free Individual, God. The mind merely makes clear to itself all of the implications of its thought of Being, and there emerges at once the ontological proof of God as the underlying presupposition of all thought. It is the strongest proof, for the reason that it is the kernel or nucleus of all the other proofs. It is the primary speculative insight — this insight into the fact that the highest principle of the Universe is a Living Person, and can be no other. Upon it, of course, rest (as our author very clearly sees and definitely states) the freedom and immortality of man. If the highest principle of the universe is not a person, but an unconscious force, then, certainly, our personality is only a phenomenal one, and sure to vanish through the activity of that primal unconscious Energy. The Absolute Energy of the World gives rise to all characteristics that appertain to finite things. It is eternally in the act of manifesting its nature upon them. If their characteristics are not in its form, in its image, it will stamp them out and imprint on them a more adequate impression of itself. Hence, if the Absolute is unconscious, it will everywhere show no quarter to conscious intelligence. If, on the contrary, the Absolute is free, conscious being, it will everywhere cancel unconscious being, and produce everywhere in the universe a current of progress towards consciousness; the mineral will tend to the chemical synthesis which forms crystals and salts, and thence ascends to the synthesis of vegetable life, which again mounts to animal life, and this last finally reaches thought and becomes free, responsible, and immortal — an image of the Eternal. Hence, progress is the law wherever the highest principle is Personality.

Were the highest principle blind force, the existence of its opposite — of intelligent beings — would be utterly inexplicable, because Consciousness is not found among the constituent elements of Unconsciousness; so that, had blind force a self-analytic or self-dirempting power, it could, perhaps, "posit" or create its opposite as a chaos upon which to manifest itself by rising from it step by step, developing its constituents and uniting them, until at last it produced its image. In fact, a world of development, even of *change* or *process*, could not be, were the

ultimate principle a simple one, like force, and not, rather, a highest complexity of synthesis, like the principle of personality. For personality *does* contain constituent elements, each of which, when isolated, is unconscious; and, moreover, it possesses the power of self-analysis or diremption, and hence can manifest itself to itself through a series of *stadia*, beginning with its utter opposite and rising through successive syntheses continually to more and more adequate adumbrations (and at last to *images*) of itself.

Our author (p. 72) ventures the opinion that these three proofs of God are pantheistic. This attracts our attention to his definition of Pantheism: "The world is the substance of which God is the life, the pervasive, controlling force." For the reason that they have the form simply of inferring a cause for the effects which compose the world, it is impossible to rise to an absolute. All that one can infer is a cause adequate to produce the effects that one can see. But the ontological proof derived from the necessary nature of being transcends the three proofs mentioned (Cosmological, Teleological, and Ethico-logical), and rises to the Absolute.

Pantheism must not be made to include the doctrine (1) which conceives God as transcending the world, and not merely immanent in it, or (2) which conceives God as consciously producing the world as His manifestation or revelation, (3) or which conceives creation as an act of free will, instead of an act of blind necessity. The ontological proof arrives at these three results: a God transcending the world, inasmuch as He energizes, not only as a creator of finite forms, but also as their destroyer, through more adequate manifestations; a conscious creator, whose thinking activity creates, and whose creation is the very focus of consciousness; a free will, not constrained by any other existence, nor impelled by any efficient cause. The only causes that operate in free intelligence are final causes. He acts to produce His manifestation, revelation (His Glory), as a spectacle to Himself, not merely a spectacle to the Alone, for He makes the creation a spectacle to itself, by having it evolve beings capable of seeing and enjoying it, and of comprehending the revelation of nature and themselves. Thinking and Will are one in the Absolute; whenever they are distinct, we have "finite intelligence," so called. Those who refuse to admit that the thought of God is creative — fearing thus to fall into pantheism by making Creation the necessary result of the rational nature and energy of God — simply impose finite limitations on Him, and conceive Him as thinking in the form of imagination, instead of *sub-specie æternitatis*.

The succeeding chapters of the book treat of the attributes of God, of Nature, of Man, Immortality, Revelation, Miracles, Inspiration, Interpretation, etc.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS PURE AND APPLIED. Editor-in-Chief, J. J. Sylvester, LL. D., F. R. S.; Associate Editor in Charge, Wm. E. Story, Ph. D.; with the coöperation of Benjamin Pierce, LL. D., F. R. S., Simon Newcomb, LL. D., F. R. S., H. A. Rowland, C. E. Published under the auspices of the Johns Hopkins University. Vol. I, No. 3. Baltimore: 1878.

The present number contains an article by George Bruce Halsted, Ph. D., tutor in Princeton College, New Jersey, on the "Bibliography of Hyper-Space and Non-Euclidean Geometry." Other articles treat of "The Elastic Arch," by Henry T. Eddy; "Researches in the Lunar Theory," by G. W. Hill; "On Professor Sylvester's Paper as to the Atomic Theory," by Professor J. W. Mallet; "*Theorie des Fonctions Numériques Simplement Périodiques*," par Edouard Lucas; and notes on mathematical subjects.